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Abstract: I survey recent developments in antipoverty policy in the United States over the past
decade and examine how the safety net and tax system affects poverty and its correlates using
data from the 2000 to 2010 waves of the Current Population Survey-Annual Social and
Economic Supplement. Unlike the 1980s and 1990s, and until the health care overhaul in 2009,
the first decade of the 21st Century was relatively tepid in terms of major transfer policy reforms.
However, real spending on most major social program increased significantly, and in some cases
doubled or tripled, in response to demographic shifts and the deep recession. In spite of the real
growth in social insurance and means-tested transfer programs, the trends in after-tax and
transfer poverty rates were little affected, and if anything, suggest the safety net has lost some of
its antipoverty bite in terms of alleviating hardship among those living in deep poverty.
Keywords: Safety net, poverty, inequality, volatility
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The reach of antipoverty policy in the United States is vast, ranging from explicit income
maintenance payments to implicit insurance via the tax code that smoothes income and
consumption changes across people and over time (Kniesner and Ziliak 2002). However, how,
and for whom, to provide support continues to be the subject of vigorous debate (Moffitt 2003;
Currie 2006; Murray 2006; Haskins and Sawhill 2009; Heinrich and Scholz 2009; Ziliak 2009).
While much reform effort in recent decades has been directed to making the safety net more
work-based, especially the 1990s welfare reforms and expansions in the Earned Income Tax
Credit, concurrently there has been a silent epidemic of disability insurance claims and awards
that has been associated with a substantial decline in employment among the low-skilled (Autor
and Duggan 2006; 2010). In this paper I discuss some recent developments in antipoverty policy
and the association of these changes on the extent and distribution of poverty and its correlates.
The safety net in the U.S. is typically grouped into the two broad categories of social
insurance and means tested transfers. As a general rule, social insurance programs are tied to
employment or old age, while means tested transfers are not. Included in the former are Social
Security Retirement and Survivors Benefits, Disability Insurance (DI), Medicare, Unemployment
Insurance (UI), and Workers Compensation. Among the latter are Medicaid, Supplemental
Security Income (SSI), Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), housing assistance,
and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). This list is not exhaustive, but does
encompass the large majority of outlays. The other key means-tested program that is directly tied
to employment is the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC).
[Table 1 here]
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Table 1 contains expenditures on these programs for 1999 and 2009, the most recent
year where data is widely available across programs. The values are reported in real 2010 dollars
using the personal consumption expenditure deflator. Over the past decade, real spending on UI
increased 370 percent, SNAP rose by 140 percent, Medicare increased 92 percent, DI rose by 86
percent, Medicaid increased 51 percent, the EITC by 48 percent, Social Security retirement and
survivors by 34 percent, and SSI by 21 percent. Real spending on TANF was flat, while that of
workers comp and housing assistance rose a modest 7 and 14 percent, respectively. While some
predicted the demise of the welfare state with the passage of welfare reform in 1996, Table 1
makes clear that the past decade has witnessed real growth in all programs save cash welfare.
What accounts for this spending boom in the safety net? The answer varies widely across
programs, but typically can be accounted for by changing demographics, business cycles, policy
implementation, and in some cases, policy reform.
I provide a brief overview of the major programs in the social safety net, and in the
process describe the target populations and basic programmatic rules, along with recent reforms
to benefit eligibility and generosity to assist the disadvantaged. I next use data from the March
Current Population Survey from 2000 to 2010 to examine how the panoply of programs in the
safety net ameliorates income poverty, inequality, and volatility. Specifically I construct three
definitions of income: one that is restricted to private income sources; a second that adds cash
transfer payments to private incomes (this is the official definition used by the Census Bureau to
measure poverty); and a third that adds to the official Census income definition net capital gains,
in-kind transfers, and net tax payments (i.e. the sum of federal, state, and payroll taxes inclusive
of the refundable EITC). With the three income measures I assess the extent to which poverty
rates are reduced by the safety net.
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Because most transfer programs do not have the explicit goal of eliminating poverty,
rather the more modest objective of ameliorating income shortfalls, the poverty rate will not
capture improvements among those persons living far below the poverty line. Hence I estimate
how the safety net reduces the so-called aggregate poverty gap, which is the amount of money
required to lift all persons up to the poverty line (Ziliak 2006; Ben-Shalom, Moffitt, and Scholz
2011). I complement this analysis with an assessment of how the safety net affects the
distribution of income for the population overall as well as for the subpopulation of persons
living in poverty. Moreover, I examine how much the safety net smoothes idiosyncratic income
changes over time by matching individuals across subsequent waves of the March CPS.
Together the descriptive analysis sheds light on how changes in safety net spending have
affected the level, intensity, and inequality of poverty.
II.

Recent Changes in U.S. Antipoverty Policy
Few would argue that changes in the U.S. social policy landscape in the 1980s and 1990s

were nothing short of epochal. They altered significantly the economic rewards to work and to
participation in transfer programs, and affected all segments of the low-income population.
Perhaps no other demographic group was singled out by policy as prominently as single mothers
with dependent children. President Reagan set in motion the retrenchment of the cash welfare
program Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) by increasing the implicit tax rate on
earnings and reducing the liquid asset level necessary to qualify for benefits as part of Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1981. This retrenchment was completed by President
Clinton with passage of the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act, which abolished AFDC and replaced it with the new time-limited, block-grant program
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF). Concurrent to restrictions to cash welfare
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were enhanced incentives for single mothers to work via expansions in the Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC) as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and OBRA 1990 and 1993, as well as
expansions in Medicaid program eligibility and later the introduction of the Supplemental
Children’s Health Insurance Program as part of OBRA 1997. In 1991 Congress was required to
modify rules for child eligibility in the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program in light of
the Supreme Court’s 1990 Zebley decision that ruled unconstitutional previous guidelines. The
revised rules resulted in a large increase in children participating in SSI, including many from
single mother families on the AFDC program (Kubik 1999; Schmidt and Sevak 2004). The
reforms to anti-poverty policy at the end of the 20th Century have been studied extensively
elsewhere (Bane and Ellwood 1996; Blank 1997; Moffitt 2003; Grogger and Karoly 2005;
Haskins 2007; Ziliak 2009). I take these reforms as the starting point in this chapter and instead
focus on changes to the safety net over the past decade.
Social Insurance
The growth in Social Security Retirement and Survivors Benefits from $424 billion in
1999 to $568 billion in 2009 is primarily a consequence of the demographic aging of the labor
force into retirement years. The program is targeted to workers age 62 and older who have
accumulated at least 40 quarters of covered employment in their careers, and benefits are paid
out as a progressive function of pre-retirement earnings, i.e. low-wage workers receive a higher
proportion of pre-retirement earnings paid out as benefits during retirement. Retirement benefits
in 2008 provided 90 percent or more of income for nearly one-third of all beneficiaries, and over
half of income for two-thirds of retirees, thus making it the single, largest anti-poverty program.1

1

http://www.socialsecurity.gov/policy/docs/chartbooks/fast_facts/2010/fast_facts10.pdf
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Little has changed in terms of retirement program benefit structure since the Greenspan
Commission of 1983. The most substantive legislative change in the past decade was the
elimination of the retirement earnings test in 2000 for those persons who receive benefits starting
at normal retirement age and yet to continue to work in the paid labor force.2 Specifically, for
those retirees age 65 and older who continue to receive wage income, benefits are no longer
reduced because of those earnings. Perhaps surprising in light of the current labor market, this
change came about in part because of a shortage of skilled labor at the end of the high pressure
1990s economic expansion (Krueger and Solow 2001). But because relatively few seniors work
beyond age 65, this reform likely introduced minimal upward pressure on outlays. The other
change to retirement benefits this decade was the one-time payment of $250 in 2009 to recipients
as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA).
Like Social Security, the increase in Medicare spending is largely reflective of the aging
population. Primary eligibility commences at age 65 for those qualifying for monthly Social
Security Retirement Benefits, and with the growth in the latter Medicare spending has increased
in lockstep. However, there are additional forces at work that has led to outlays in Medicare
nearly doubling and catching up to those of retirement benefits. First, medical care inflation has
exceeded overall inflation by nearly double over the past decade, thus driving up real costs.
Second, recipients of DI are often eligible for Medicare after five months, and with the growth of
disability, more Americans under age 65 are receiving Medicare coverage. Third, in 2004,
President Bush signed into law a major expansion of Medicare benefits known as Part D, or the
prescription drug benefit, that covers prescription costs not otherwise covered by Parts A and B

2

http://www.ssa.gov/history/briefhistory3.html
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of Medicare. Participation in Part D is voluntary, and requires payment of a monthly premium,
but that cost is either waived or heavily subsidized for low-income retirees.
Disability insurance was added to the Social Security Program in 1956, but in this case
eligibility is restricted to those workers under normal retirement age and who have worked in at
least five of the last ten years and can no longer hold gainful employment owing to disability.
Spending on DI, and to a lesser extent SSI, has been startling not only in magnitude, but in its
stealth nature. That is, unlike other social insurance programs covering retirees or the
unemployed that receive extensive coverage from policymakers and the press, the rise in
disability has taken place largely out of public view and yet DI was the third fastest growing
social insurance program and annual appropriation on DI was $121 billion in 2009. This growth
in outlay in the last decade has taken place not because of any major policy reform (1984 was the
last major reform). Rather, as argued convincingly by Autor and Duggan (2006), it emanates
from changes in the implementation of program rules that result in a greater fraction of awards
conditional on applying, coupled with a greater fraction of the population applying for benefits.
The latter it seems stems both from a decade-long slump in employment growth and a larger pool
of potential workers from the increase in female labor force participation post 1970.
The remaining major social insurance programs are UI and workers comp. These
programs were the first in the safety net, having been established in several states in the first two
decades of the 20th century. They are also unique among social insurance programs in the
federal-state partnership that underlies funding and administration (several means-tested
programs are federal-state partnerships). To qualify for workers comp a person must have a
temporary or permanent work-related injury or illness that precludes working at the pre-injury
job or one similar to it. Nearly three-fourths of benefits are paid out as medical only benefits,
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with the remainder quarter as cash-replacement benefits or both.3 There have been no major
policy changes at the federal level in recent years, though some states have altered benefit
eligibility and payment in order to rein in costs. As a consequence, real spending has been fairly
stable over the decade.
The UI system was codified into federal law as part of the 1935 Social Security Act, but
major responsibility for program rules and administration largely rests at the state level. Today,
virtually the entire civilian labor force is eligible for UI benefits provided they meet basic work
criteria. Specifically, unless they are a new labor market entrant awaiting the start of a job, the
claimant must have worked in covered employment in the first four out of the last five calendar
quarters, must not have voluntarily left their job, must be able to work, and must be actively
seeking work. Conditional on passing the work test, benefit amounts vary widely across states,
though typically it is a function of past wages in the base period used for eligibility, subject to a
cap. Normal UI receipt lasts up to 26 weeks, but the Extended Benefits Program that is triggered
in periods of high unemployment allows for extensions up to 13 weeks. In response to the deep
recession, in June 2008 Congress passed the Emergency Unemployment Compensation Program
that added an additional 13 weeks of federally funded UI benefits. This was amended in
November 2008, and again in November 2009, so that certain workers in high unemployment
states could qualify for as much as 99 weeks of benefits. The nearly four-fold increase in real UI
benefits to $122 billion by 2009 is unprecedented, reflecting the larger pool of unemployed from
the protracted weak labor market, the duration of unemployment, and direct Congressional action
extending eligibility.

3

http://www.socialsecurity.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/supplement/2010/workerscomp.pdf

8
Means-Tested Transfers
The Medicaid program was established in 1965 alongside the Medicare program. The
population served differs in that Medicaid is targeted to low-income and low liquid asset
individuals and families, and is the largest of the means-tested transfer programs. Funding for
the program is shared by federal and state governments, and many program parameters relating
to eligibility and benefit coverage are set at the state level. Historically the majority of recipients
have been single mothers and their dependent children, though the majority of outlays are spent
on poor seniors requiring institutionalized care (e.g. hospital and nursing home). Like Medicare,
the 50 percent increase in the spending over the past decade reflects to some extent the aging of
the population (i.e. more seniors require extended care in hospital or nursing homes), as well as
the above average medical care inflation. It also reflects higher caseloads resulting from the
weak economy and expanded eligibility in many states starting in the 1990s for families with
income 2-3 times the federal poverty line. Going forward, spending on Medicaid is expected to
grow substantially both from care of the aged indigent, and as a result of the Affordable Care Act
of 2010 that will expand Medicaid eligibility to all families with incomes below 138 percent of
the federal poverty line starting in 2014.
The SSI program, which was added to the Social Security Program in 1972, provides
cash assistance to the needy aged, the blind, and the disabled. While identifying potential
recipients based on age and vision is readily assessed, verifying disabilities is difficult and
fraught with controversy. As described in Daly and Burkhauser (2003) there is a three-step
process in identifying disabilities: (i) a physical or mental malfunction that (ii) leads to an
impairment which in turn (iii) generates an inability to perform socially expected functions,
notably work for adults and schooling for children. Challenges notwithstanding, the bulk of the
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SSI caseload are disabled recipients, notably those suffering from mental impairments. On top
of the programmatic criteria of being aged, blind, or disabled, to qualify for SSI the family must
meet both income and liquid asset tests. The SSI program has substantial federal oversight, with
grant and eligibility criteria set at the federal level, along with statutory benefit reduction rates on
earned and unearned incomes. On top of federal aid, about half of the states supplement the
federal grant for individuals living independently. Aside from a series of changes to SSI in the
2000s that restored benefit eligibility for certain immigrant groups who had lost coverage as part
of the 1996 welfare reform, there have been no substantive changes in SSI policy in the last
decade that would lead to the 20 percent growth in real spending, and instead likely reflect the
overall increase in disability awards also affecting the DI program.
As noted previously, the 1996 welfare reform replaced the former AFDC program with
the block granted TANF program. States actually began experimenting with their welfare
programs in the early-1990s via waivers from federal regulations granted by the U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services (DHSS). These waivers included time limits on benefit receipt,
work requirements, and work incentives such as higher earnings disregards and liquid-asset
limits. The waivers were codified into federal legislation with the passage of PRWORA. Under
PRWORA, cash assistance is no longer an entitlement and aid is subject to a federal lifetime
limit of 60 months (or shorter based on state discretion). Under AFDC about 70 percent of
spending was paid as cash benefits and the remainder as in-kind, but today the TANF program
spends about 70 percent of resources on in-kind programs and 30 percent on cash benefits. The
Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 reauthorized the TANF program and in the process strengthened
rules governing work participation. However, a 2010 GAO report suggests little change in the
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ensuing years in TANF work participation rates.4 Although the federal block-grant contribution
to the program has remained fixed in nominal terms at $16.6 billion since the 1996 reform, states
increased funding during the recession and as part of ARRA 2009 the federal government
provided additional TANF funds. These changes have kept real state and federal spending on
TANF unchanged over the last decade.
The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) provides food assistance to
low-income and low-asset persons without regard to age and family structure, and thus the target
population is broader than either Medicaid or TANF. As part of the 2008 Farm Bill, SNAP
replaced the former Food Stamp Program primarily in name only in a bid to reduce perceived
stigma associated with use of food stamps. Indeed the name change is left to state discretion and
only 25 of the 50 states plus the District of Columbia have adopted the SNAP moniker. The
remaining half either kept the former food stamp name or adopted an alternative. The program
rules, benefits, and funds are set primarily at the federal level, with the benefits indexed to
inflation. Recipients of TANF or SSI are categorically eligible for SNAP, though evidence in
Ziliak, Gundersen, and Figlio (2003) suggests that the links between TANF and SNAP appear to
have weakened after PRWORA.
While most of 1990s welfare reform was directed at the AFDC program, food stamps
was not devoid of reforms of its own, notably the phasing out of paper coupons with Electronic
Benefit Transfer cards, and restrictions on benefit receipt among both legal immigrants and socalled ABAWDS, able bodied adults without dependents working less than 20 hours per week.
Among other changes, the 2002 Farm Bill restored eligibility for most of the legal residents
removed by PRWORA and liberalized financial eligibility rules, notably asset tests. In 2008

4

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10525.pdf
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states were given the option of increasing or removing both the vehicle and liquid asset tests and
most have chosen that option. Unlike the TANF program, SNAP participation moves
countercyclically with the business cycle, and thus the more than doubling in expenditures since
1999 resulted in part from the weak economy. Spending rose also in 2009 as part of ARRA that
temporarily raised benefits by an average of just under 14 percent.
The housing assistance program is unique among means-tested transfers because of its
decentralized administration at the local level. Today there are more than 2,400 local housing
authorities charged with setting guidelines on program eligibility for either public housing or
Section 8 vouchers. Public housing in the U.S. began during the Great Depression and then
developed in earnest after WWII. Currently there are over 14,000 units nationwide serving
nearly 2.3 million people, the majority of whom are either elderly or disabled.5 Because of lack
of investment maintaining the properties, during the past two decades many housing units have
been demolished and replaced with Section 8 vouchers. These vouchers subsidize the rent on
privately owned units (though a portion is dedicated to publicly owned). Individuals are
expected to cover the first 30 percent of monthly rent, and then the voucher covers the remainder
subject to a cap. Eligibility varies across housing authorities, but the basic income test requires
family income to be less than some percentage of county median income, e.g. less than 50
percent of median. Because of excess demand for vouchers and public housing, most authorities
have created waiting lists that can be several years long. Many have simply closed waiting lists.
The final program covered in this section is the Earned Income Tax Credit, which is a
refundable tax credit that is available to low-income working families and individuals. The
growth of the EITC began with Tax Reform Act of 1986, followed by even more extensive
changes with OBRA 1990 and OBRA 1993. The latter Acts altered the credit to be more
5
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generous for families with two or more qualifying children and also extended the credit to
childless workers. Additionally, ARRA added a third tier by increasing the subsidy rate to 45
percent for families with 3 or more qualifying children for the 2009 and 2010 tax years. The Tax
Relief and Job Creation Act of 2010 extended this feature for the 2011 and 2012 tax years, and
an earlier provision eliminated the Advance EITC option. As a consequence of the changing
labor force composition and policy, expenditures on the EITC make it the largest cash assistance
program to low-income working persons.
III.

Antipoverty Policy and Antipoverty Effectiveness
In light of the growth of social insurance and mean-tested transfer programs over the past

decade, I examine whether these additional expenditures have resulted in any trend break in
poverty. The analysis is descriptive and thus causal claims will not be made; however, as a first
step in understanding the role of the safety net in eradicating poverty it is instructive to document
how poverty levels in America change once cash and in-kind transfer programs are accounted for
in poverty measurement.
I consider three measures of income that reflect an individual’s resource base to avoid
poverty: (1) pre-tax and transfer income; (2) the sum of (1) and cash social insurance and meanstested transfers; and (3) the sum of (2), in-kind insurance and transfer program contributions, and
net capital gains, less net tax payments. Definition (2) is the same as that used by the Census
Bureau for official poverty statistics, and thus in comparing resource measure (1) to (2) we
observe how the level of poverty is affected by government cash payments. Because net capital
gains tends to be minimal for most low-income families, comparing measure (2) to (3) permits us
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to observe how poverty changes with the inclusion of in-kind payments, as well as tax payments
and credits.
The data come from the Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the Current
Population Survey for calendar years 1999-2009 (interview years 2000-2010), which is used by
the U.S. Census Bureau to provide official estimates of poverty and inequality. The Data
Appendix provides details on the sample and how the income measures are constructed. It is
instructive to highlight, however, how in-kind transfers are defined here. In-kind benefits
include so-called near-cash transfers such as SNAP, school breakfast and lunch, and subsidized
housing. These are in-kind benefits with a near dollar for benefit market value. I also include
health benefits from the Medicaid and Medicare programs, which are much more difficult to
value. They are typically valued either at market values, that is, the amount that it costs to obtain
similar products in the private market, or at less than market rates, what the Census Bureau calls
“fungible value” (Census P60-186RD 1992). In the CPS families are assigned fungible values if
and only if their family income exceeds that which is needed for food and housing under the
proviso that extra resources exist to purchase private health benefits. If family income falls short
of food and housing needs then the fungible value is zero; otherwise, the fungible value equals
the difference between family income and food and housing expenses up to the market value of
medical benefits. The implication then is that fungible values of health benefits will be small or
nonexistent for many poor families.
Incidence of Poverty
The first measure of safety-net antipoverty effectiveness I consider is the poverty rate,
sometimes known as the “headcount rate.” The poverty rate represents the percentage of the
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population that is poor, , where N is the size of the population and Q is the number of poor
persons. Specifically, if we let y denote a person’s income and z a pre-established poverty line,
then a person is poor if y  z and not poor if y  z . In this case poverty is a discrete state
reflecting the fraction of persons who have not yet attained a minimally adequate level of income
to meet basic socially determined needs. In the U.S. the poverty line varies by family size and is
adjusted over time by changes in inflation, but otherwise it represents the same fixed basket of
goods and services since its inception in the 1960s and thus the U.S. measure is considered an
absolute poverty measure (Fisher 1992). While this definition is transparent, it is also vague
because the notion of poor depends on the resources being measured and where the cutoff
separating the poor from the non-poor is drawn, each of which may be subjectively determined
across time and space.
[Figure 1 and Table 2 here]
Figure 1 depicts trends in poverty rates from 1999 to 2009, and Table 2 contains the
corresponding estimates of the number of persons in poverty. From 1999 to 2007 pre-tax and
transfer poverty rates held steady at about 21 percent of the population, but with a growing
population the number in poverty rose by 7.5 million from 54.8 million to 62.4 million. In the
suing two recessionary years, pre-tax and transfer poverty rates increased nearly 4 percentage
points (18 percent on the baseline of 20.9 percent) and an additional 12.5 million Americans fell
into poverty. The official poverty rate likewise rose from 11.8 percent of the population in 1999
to 14.3 percent in 2009, and with a post-2007 increase of nearly 2 percentage points (or 15
percent on a baseline of 12.5 percent). As seen in Table 2, in a typical year cash transfers and
social insurance lift 41 percent of the pre-tax and pre-transfer poor out of poverty. Once we
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account for in-kind transfers such as SNAP, Medicaid, and Medicare, as well as tax payments
and the EITC, an additional 16 percent are lifted out of poverty over and above the official rate.
Combined the safety reduces pre-tax and transfer poverty by just over one-half. However, even
though expenditures on these programs increased substantially over the past decade, the antipoverty effectiveness in terms of the headcount ratio has been fairly steady. There was a
noticeable boost in 2009 relative to 2008 as a result of ARRA, but perhaps not as large as might
be expected given the level of appropriation. Part of this, of course, is explained by the fact that
many beneficiaries of SNAP and UI are not living below the poverty line.
[Figure 2 here]
Figure 2 explores in more detail the contribution of each component of the after-tax and
in-kind transfer measure to poverty reduction by highlighting how many persons are removed (or
added in the case of taxes) from poverty each year. This is computed by taking the official
Census income definition as the baseline and adding each tax or in-kind transfer separately. In a
typical year between 1999 and 2007 the EITC lifted about 4 million persons out of poverty, but
with the deep recession and extensions as part of ARRA, just over 5 million were lifted out of
poverty in 2009. The antipoverty effectiveness of SNAP accelerated over the decade, with about
2 million lifted out of poverty each year through 2003, but that figure more than doubled to 4.5
million in 2009, again both owing to the deep recession and expanded benefit generosity in
response to the recession. Capital gains, owing to the rarity of low-income persons receiving
capital income, and housing benefits, owing to the relatively low participation in the programs,
do little to lift families out of poverty. The individual income tax system (federal, state, payroll)
has the opposite effect of reducing disposable income and thus in a typical year between 1999
and 2005 resulted in about 3.5 million more in poverty. This grew rapidly in the next two years
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as low and moderate income persons gained traction in the labor market (note in Figure 1 the
decline in pre-tax and transfer poverty), but then there is evidence of “regression to the mean” by
2009 with a return to pre-2006 levels of persons placed into after-tax income poverty.
[Figure 3 here]
An important barometer of the safety net is how well it provides support to our more
vulnerable populations of children and aged. In Figure 3 I depict the number of adults 65 and
older and the number of children under age 18 in poverty across the three income measures for
both 1999 and 2009. The figure shows that on a pre-tax and transfer basis that slightly more
seniors are in poverty than children, but on post-tax and transfer basis there is a yawning gap in
the numbers of children left in poverty compared to the elderly. In 1999 the number of seniors in
poverty after accounting for taxes and transfers was 83 percent lower than the pre-tax basis,
compared to 37 percent lower among children. In 2009 the comparable figures were 85 percent
and 41 percent, suggesting that the ARRA expansions of SNAP and EITC helped children more
than adults, but still the numbers children lifted out of poverty by the safety net was less than
half that of seniors.
Intensity and Depth of Poverty
A common complaint levied against the headcount rate is its failure to account for the
intensity of poverty. That is, individuals $500 below the threshold are given the same weight as
those $5000 below the threshold, even though most would agree that the deprivation of the latter
likely far outweighs the deprivation of the former. A transparent alternative that captures the
intensity of poverty is the so-called poverty gap (Ziliak 2006; Ben-Shalom, et al. 2011), defined
as
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∑

max

,0 ,

.

This measure reflects the aggregate income deficit among the poor population; that is, for each
poor person we compute how much money they would require to be lifted up to the family-size
specific poverty line, and then add this deficit up across the entire population of poor persons.
For persons above the line,

, the gap is zero. The attraction of the poverty gap is that it is

expressed in dollars, and while this means that the measure is not scale invariant (i.e. will differ
under different currencies), it does permit an examination of how the intensity of poverty
changes with the safety net under stable units.
[Table 3 and Figure 4 here]
Table 3 presents estimates of the aggregate poverty gap for the three alternative resource
measures, expressed in billions of real 2010 dollars. In the table, Q refers to the number of pretax and transfer poor. That is, in the first column we add up the pre-tax and transfer poverty gap
among the pre-tax and transfer poor. In the column labeled Official the exercise is “among those
who were pre-tax and transfer poor, how much of the gap remains after we account for cash
social insurance and means-tested transfers?” Likewise, in the after-tax and transfers column the
exercise is “among those who were pre-tax and transfer poor, how much of the gap remains after
we account for cash social insurance and means-tested transfers, as well as in-kind transfers and
taxes?” In 1999, among the pre-tax and transfer poor, the amount of money required to lift all
(pre-tax and transfer) poor persons out of poverty was $261 billion. By 2009 $385 billion was
required, or an increase of 48 percent. Using the official resource definition the aggregate gap in
1999 was 61 percent lower at $102 billion needed to lift all officially poor persons out of
poverty. The estimate in 2009 was $155 billion, or 52 percent higher, which suggests that the
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cash transfer safety net has slipped in its effectiveness of reducing the intensity of poverty. Once
we add in-kind transfers along with net tax payments the aggregate gap falls by about two-thirds
in comparison to the pre-tax and transfer gap (comparing column (3) to (1)). Again, however,
even with the broadest measure of income the aggregate gap increased 50 percent between 1999
and 2009, suggesting that the safety net is losing some of its antipoverty bite.
Figure 4 depicts aggregate poverty gaps for children and the elderly in 1999 and 2009.
The figure underscores how much more the safety net reduces the intensity of poverty among
older Americans relative to children. The safety net in both years fills 92 percent of the gap
among those 65 and older, and under 60 percent among children. There was a slight
improvement in filling the gap among children between 1999 and 2009, increasing from 57
percent to 59 percent. This suggests that the reduced antipoverty effectiveness identified in
Table 3 comes from adults between the ages of 18 and 64.
[Figures 5 and 6 here]
Along with the intensity of poverty it is instructive to examine how the safety net affects
the depth of poverty. Although there are many axiomatically derived measures of deep poverty
(e.g.Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke 1984), here I consider the simple measure used by the Census
Bureau and that is the fraction of the population living below one-half of their family-size
specific poverty threshold, i.e. ∑

0.5 ∗

, where I(.) is an indicator variable taking on

a value of 1 if income is below half the threshold and 0 otherwise. Figure 5 depicts trends in
deep poverty for the population overall, and Figure 6 separately by children and the elderly.
Figure 5 shows that by 2009 16 percent of the population had pre-tax and transfer incomes below
one-half of the poverty threshold, about 6.3 percent of the officially poor were in deep poverty,
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and 4.6 percent of the post-tax and in-kind transfer poor were in deep poverty. These rates are
28.6, 34.9, and 34.4 percent higher than their 1999 counterparts, respectively, again suggesting
that the safety net expansions over the past decade are not keeping up with the increasing
deprivation facing the extreme poor. Have the ARRA expansions fared better? The answer
seems a qualified yes. Between 2007 and 2009 pre-tax deep poverty increased 19 percent from
13.9 to 16.4, and deep poverty as measured by official resource definition increased 20 percent.
However, post-tax and in-kind transfer deep poverty increased a lower 15 percent between 2007
and 2009, most likely owing to increased SNAP receipts. Among children in Figure 6, the
comparable increases from 2007 to 2009 were 25 percent, 19 percent, and 11 percent, suggesting
that very poor children were disproportionately exposed to the economic downturn, but the
ARRA expansions likely ameliorated their situation more than other groups.
Inequality of Poverty
A primary objective of the safety net is to equalize post-tax and transfer incomes across
the population. Although there has been extensive research on trends in wage inequality (Katz
and Autor 1999), and most recently top income inequality (Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez 2011),
there has been comparatively less on the effect of the safety net on income inequality (Karoly
1994), especially at the lower tail of the distribution. Because my objective is to compare how
inequality changes as the resource definition is expanded to account for the safety net, for ease of
presentation I first adopt a summary measure of inequality. Specifically I use the normalized
coefficient of variation,

, which is bounded below by 0 reflecting no inequality and above by

1 reflecting perfect inequality. The CV is measured as the ratio of the standard deviation of
income to its mean.
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[Figures 7 and 8 here]
Figure 7 depicts trends in overall income inequality, showing that pre-tax and transfer
income inequality increased over the past decade from 0.52 to 0.56, and where most of the
increase occurred between 1999 and 2000. The addition of cash transfers and social insurance
contained in the official resource measure reduces inequality by about 5 percent in a typical year,
and while this is fairly stable over most of the decade, there is some evidence of additional
redistributive effectiveness over the past couple of years. Expanding the resource definition to
include taxes and in-kind transfers reduces pre-tax inequality by 11 percent in a typical year, and
this redistributive function actually increased by 24 percent since 1999 (and 13 percent alone
between 2007 and 2009). This is suggestive that the expanding safety net at the end of last
decade played an important redistributive role overall. We see this further in Figure 8 with the
ratio of the 90th percentile to the 10th percentile of the income distribution for the official census
measure and after-tax and transfer income (the 10th percentile is 0 for the pre-tax and transfer
measure, and thus the 90-10 ratio is undefined). In 1999 the after-tax and in-kind transfer 90-10
ratio is 26 percent lower than the official Census measure, and this increases to 28 percent lower
in 2009, suggesting again that expanded SNAP and EITC modestly helped the lower tail of the
distribution.
[Figure 9 here]
Figure 9 presents the parallel set of inequality trends as in Figure 7 for the subpopulation
of poor persons (based on the official poverty definition). The story is more complicated among
the poor as pre-tax and transfer inequality has been unchanged over the decade, and cash
transfers have consistently reduced inequality by about 23 percent in a typical year, the exception
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being 2009 when it lowered inequality by a more modest 21 percent. Perhaps surprising, the
post-tax and in-kind transfer safety net actually exacerbates among the poor. A closer
examination reveals that as expected the mean level of income increases with in-kind transfers
and tax credits, but the variance increases by more, thus resulting in higher inequality than cash
income alone. This could occur, for example, because of differential participation rates among
the poor in in-kind transfers and credits, especially in light of the fact that the poor contain both
workers and nonworkers and the EITC is only available to those who work in the labor market.
Volatility of Income
Although much of economic research is aimed at quantifying the costs of the safety net in
terms of reduced incentives to work, save, consume, and marry, more recently there has been
interest in quantifying the benefits of social programs and taxation in terms of reduced economic
volatility (Gruber 2000; Kniesner and Ziliak 2002; Blundell and Pistaferri 2003; Huggett and
Parra 2010). This is important because a central goal of economic policy is to stabilize
household consumption in the presence of adverse economic events, whether the shocks are
economy wide or idiosyncratic. Most transfers are explicit in their stabilizing role because they
provide direct cash or near-cash income support. Progressive income taxes of the sort found in
the U.S. provide implicit insurance because when before-tax income falls the household’s tax
burden also falls so that after-tax spendable income drops by less than the drop in pre-tax
income. Combined the U.S. tax and transfer system should reduce the volatility of income.
To measure volatility I adopt the metric employed by Ziliak, Hardy, and Bollinger (2011)
for earnings volatility; namely the standard deviation of the arc percent change defined as
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100 ∗
where

,

is income for person i in time t, and

, is the person-specific time mean

across the matched pair of years. The key advantages of this measure over the variance of log
income is that it is defined even if income is zero in one of the two years, and that it is symmetric
and bounded below by -200 percent and above by +200 percent. However, the symmetry
property is violated if income is negative one year, say due to a business loss, and positive the
next. As a consequence, Ziliak, et al. modify the arithmetic mean in the denominator as
, where abs(.) refers to the absolute value. This modified measure at once
permits negative incomes and retains the symmetry property of -200 percent and +200 percent.
[Figures 10 and 11]
Figures 10 and 11 depict trends in income volatility over the past decade for the
population overall and those living in poverty. As described in the appendix, the data for this
analysis comes from the March CPS whereby I exploit the longitudinal dimension of the survey
design that permits linking of the same individual across two consecutive years. The unit of
analysis is the head of household for those families with the same head in both years. The
poverty sample in Figure 11 imposes the additional restriction that the family remain in poverty
for both years (as defined by the official definition). Figure 10 reveals that income volatility
across all measures was fairly stable over the decade, with the possible exception of pre-tax and
transfer income volatility that showed signs of increasing during the recent recession. The safety
net plays a big role in reducing income volatility—the post-tax and in-kind transfer series is
about 30 percent lower than the pre-tax and transfer counterpart in an average year. This income
smoothing increased during the recession, likely in response to ARRA programs.
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Figure 11 shows that among the poor the level of income volatility is much higher (by
about 70 percent) in any given year relative to the population as a whole, and that the trend in
pre-tax and transfer volatility actually declined after 2006. Again the safety net plays a vital role
for the poor in that in a typical year income volatility after-tax and in-kind transfers is 40 percent
lower compared to pre-tax and transfer income. This effect is one-third larger than for the
population overall. On the contrary Figure 11 also shows a trend increase in the volatility of
income once the safety net programs are accounted for in the resource measure. In fact the
official measure smoothes income volatility 25 percent less in 2009 than in 1999, while the aftertax and in-kind transfer measure smoothes 12 percent less, suggesting that the effectiveness of
the explicit and implicit insurance provided by the safety net is weaker in the current downturn
for the poor.
IV.

Conclusion
I provide an overview of recent developments in antipoverty policy in the United States

and then document how the growth in social insurance and means-tested transfers have affected
income poverty, inequality, and volatility using data from the CPS. I find that with few
exceptions real spending on the safety net increased substantially in the past decade, owing
primarily to demographic shifts and business cycles rather than fundamental policy reforms.
In 1999 the safety net lifted nearly 30 million Americans out of poverty, and in 2009
nearly 40 million were lifted above the poverty line, but in each year this translates into just over
50 percent of the pre-tax and pre-transfer poor. Thus, despite the increased spending the antipoverty effectiveness of the safety net was little changed. Indeed, I provide evidence that this
enhanced spending has not necessarily translated into improved economic status of the poorest
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poor in America as the intensity and volatility of after-tax and transfer poverty have increased in
recent years.
What likely accounts for the lackluster performance of the safety net in combating
poverty, especially deep poverty? Part of the reason owes to the fact that the social insurance
programs in the safety net are not targeted directly to the poor. This implies that the growth in
Social Security, Medicare, UI, DI, and workers comp could in fact be improving the outcomes of
middle class families rather than the poor per se. Likewise, among means-tested transfers, the
growth in Medicaid occurred among those with gross incomes one to two times the poverty line,
and SNAP growth likely occurred among households recently suffering job loss and some of
those have gross incomes above the poverty line (recall SNAP eligibility extends to 130 percent
of poverty). In addition, the near 50 percent increase in the EITC clearly improved the
employment of single mothers with dependent children, but evidence in Ziliak (2009) suggests
that among low-skilled single mothers the combination of welfare reform and the EITC
expansions resulted in lower after-tax and transfer incomes. The higher earnings coupled with
EITC supplements were insufficient to offset the loss of other transfer income among those in
deep poverty. These trends suggest that future policy reforms need to be directed at improving
the outcomes of the truly disadvantaged.

25
Data Appendix
The data derive from the 2000–2010 waves (1999–2009 calendar years) of the March
Annual Social and Economic Study of the Current Population Survey (CPS). The CPS is the
data source used in constructing official poverty statistics in the U.S., and I follow the same
method. Specifically the unit of analysis is noninstitutionalized families (including related
subfamilies) and unrelated individuals. The survey is fielded in March and the income
information refers to the previous year. The family is the basic unit of analysis for poverty
measurement, where family means two or more persons residing together and related by
marriage, birth, or adoption. The income of all family members is summed to yield total family
income for the year, and members of related subfamilies are assigned the family income of the
primary family unit.
In the United States economic resources for the purposes of poverty measurement entail
highly liquid forms of money income. This includes earnings, Social Security (retirement,
disability, and survivors benefits), Supplemental Security Income, Unemployment Insurance,
workers’ compensation, Temporary Assistant to Needy Families and other forms of public cash
welfare, veterans’ payments, pension income, rent/interest/dividend income, royalties, income
from estates, trusts, educational assistance, alimony, child support, assistance from outside the
household, and other income sources. Income, as defined above, is summed up across all
income-earning family members and the total is compared to the poverty threshold for that
family’s size. The threshold is updated annually by changes in the Consumer Price Index-All
Urban Consumers, thus making poverty comparisons over time inflation adjusted. All
individuals in the family are assigned the same poverty status, related subfamilies are assigned
the poverty status of the prime family, and unrelated individuals are assigned the poverty status
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based on their own income and relevant threshold. There are several groups of individuals not
accounted for in this definition including unrelated individuals under age 15 (such as foster
children), and those individuals who are institutionalized, living in college dorms, military
barracks, or the homeless living outside of shelters. All estimates are weighted using the
individual weight supplied by the Census Bureau.
In addition to official poverty rates, I consider two alternative definitions of income. The
first is pre-tax and pre-transfer income, which only includes income from private sources and
thus excludes any form of government transfer payments. The second is after-tax and in-kind
transfer income. This measure is similar to the definition of resources recommended by the
National Academy of Sciences Panel on Poverty Measurement (Citro and Michael 1995). This
measure adds to the official Census income definition net capital gains as well as the dollar value
of near-cash in-kind transfers like food stamps (Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program),
school lunch, and housing subsidies. It also adds the imputed value of the Earned Income Tax
Credit and subtracts federal, state, and payroll tax payments. Moreover, I include the imputed
value of Medicaid and Medicare. Health benefits are typically valued either at market values,
that is, the amount that it costs to obtain similar products in the private market, or at less than
market rates, what the Census Bureau calls “fungible value” (Census P60-186RD 1992). In the
CPS families are assigned fungible values if and only if their family income exceeds that which
is needed for food and housing under the proviso that extra resources exist to purchase private
health benefits. If family income falls short of food and housing needs then the fungible value is
zero; otherwise, the fungible value equals the difference between family income and food and
housing expenses up to the market value of medical benefits.
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The sample selection used in constructing measures of income volatility differs from that
used in constructing poverty rates and gaps. Specifically, I follow Ziliak, et al. (2011) by noting
that the rotating design of the CPS means that a respondent is in sample for 4 months, out 8
months, and in another 4 months, and this makes it possible to match approximately one-half of
the sample from one March interview to the next. Following the recommended Census procedure
I perform an initial match of individuals on the basis of five variables—month in sample (months
1-4 for year 1, months 5-8 for year 2); gender; line number (unique person id); household
identifier; household number; and state of residence. I then cross check the initial match on two
additional criteria: race and age of the individual. If the race of the person changed I delete that
observation. Also, if the age of the person fell, or if age increased by more than two years (owing
to the staggered timing of the initial and final interviews), then I delete those observations on the
assumption that they were bad matches. Unlike Ziliak, et al., I do not eliminate observations with
allocated incomes or adjust for CPS changes in top coding procedures over time.
All income data used in constructing the measures of poverty gaps, inequality, and
volatility is deflated by the Personal Consumption Expenditure Deflator with 2010 base year.
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Table 1. Expenditures on Selected Social Insurance and Means
Tested Transfer Programs
1999
2009
Social Insurance
OASI
Medicare
Disability Insurance
Workers Compensationa
Unemployment Insurance

424
270
65
55
26

568
519
121
59
122

Means Tested Transfers and Credits
Medicaid
Supplemental Security Income
TANF
Food Stamps/SNAP
Housing Assistancea
Earned Income Tax Credit

260
39
29
23
36
40

392
47
29
55
41
59

Note: The data are billions $2010. They are drawn from selected
years of the Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2010 Social
Security Bulletin-Annual Statistical Supplement , and USDA and
IRS Websites. a Data from 2008.

Table 2. Millions of Persons in Poverty by Alternative Resource Definition

Year
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

Pre-tax and
transfer
(1)
54.8
54.5
56.4
59.9
61.3
62.8
61.9
61.1
62.4
66.9
74.8

Official
(2)
32.3
31.6
32.9
34.6
35.9
37.0
36.9
36.5
37.3
39.8
43.5

After tax and
in-kind
transfers
(3)
26.7
27.0
27.8
29.0
30.2
31.1
30.9
30.5
31.0
33.8
35.1

Percent
Percent
Reduction Reduction
(%)
(%)
(2) ÷ (1)
(3) ÷ (2)
-41
-17
-42
-14
-42
-15
-42
-16
-41
-16
-41
-16
-40
-16
-40
-16
-40
-17
-40
-15
-42
-19

Table 3. Trends in Aggregate Poverty Gaps
Pre-tax and
transfer
Year
Official
(1)
(2)
1999
261
102
2000
270
104
2001
288
112
2002
308
119
2003
321
127
2004
324
130
2005
324
132
2006
314
129
2007
323
129
2008
347
141
385
155
2009
Note: Billions of $2010

After tax and
in-kind
transfers
(3)
84
90
94
101
106
110
111
108
108
116
125

Percent
Percent
Reduction Reduction
(%)
(%)
(2) ÷ (1)
(3) ÷ (2)
-61
-18
-62
-14
-61
-16
-61
-15
-60
-16
-60
-16
-59
-16
-59
-16
-60
-16
-60
-17
-60
-19

Figure 1. Trends in Poverty Rates
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Figure 2. Change in Number of Persons in Poverty Relative
to the Official Definition by Component
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Figure 3. Adults Age 65+ and Children under Age 18 in
Poverty by Alternative Resource Definitions
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Figure 4. Aggregate Poverty Gaps among the Elderly and
Children by Alternative Resource Definitions
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Figure 5. Trends in Deep Poverty
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Figure 6. Trends in Deep Poverty among Children and the
Elderly
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Figure 7. Trends in Income Inequality
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Figure 8. Trends in 90-10 Income Inequality
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Figure 9. Trends in Income Inequality among the Poor
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Figure 10. Trends in Family Income Volatility
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Figure 11. Trends in Family Income Volatility among the
Poor
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